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ABSTRACT
Controversies in term—structure theory center aroundthe existence and
variability of term premia in securities yields. In thispaper, the term
premiumon a default—free n—period bondis defined as the difference between
itsobservableyield to maturity and the average expectedper—annum rate of
return on an n—period strip of rollover investments inone—period bonds. To
testalternative term—structure theories withoutintroducing ex post proxies
for expectationalvariables, this paper uses a set of cross—section interest—
rateforecasts collected jointly with Burton MalkielofPrincetonUniversity
from apopulation of large institutional lenders at four differentphases of a
singleinterest—rate cycle. Statistical testsstrongly confirm the existence
of nonzero term premia at eachsurvey date, thereby rejecting the pure—
expectationstheory of the term structure. Additional testsare unable to
reject restrictions implied by the liquidity—premiumhypothesis that term
premia should be positive and increase withmaturity. Finally, contrary to
the martingale hypothesis, ex anteterm—premium data vary significantly over
time and show a positive association with thelevel of interest rates.
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Traditional theories of the term structureof interest ratesmay be interpret-
ed as arbitrage theories ofequilibrium bond prices (Malkiel,1962). Of course,
unless explicit forward, futures,and spot markets for bondsare complete in
themselves, the arbitrage pressure takesplace in the subjectivespace of partici-
pant expectations rather than in theobjective space of observed bondprices.
Arbitrage theories are necessarily
efficient—markets theories, inasmuchas wasted
information would in itself raise
opportunities for arbitrage (Ross, 1977).Alterna-
tive term—structure theories differin their views of: (1) thespecific contractu
elements of a long-term bondcontract that the market mustprice, and (2) the
forecastability of short-run movements inlong—term interest rates.
Translated to the conventionalinterest-rate metric, controversiesin term-
structure theory revolve about theexistence and variability of termpremia in
market yields. A termpremium, T, may be defined forevery finite term-to-.
maturity, n, where n=1,2,3 Each T is the difference betweenthe observable
yield on n-period bonds and theaverage expected per-annum rate of returnon an n-
period strip of rollover investments inone-period bonds. From theperspective of
modern finance, term premiaare best conceived as"market-completion premia"
(Kane, 1980). They are algebraictransforms of the net price of whateverpackageof services (e.g., of providing guarantees oraccepting specific portfolio risks) is
deemed necessary to "complete" bond markets. In suggesting that termpremia be
interpreted as equilibrating allowances necessary to compensate marginal lenders
or borrowers for the extra service of holding or issuing debt whose terms-to—
maturity are longer or shorter than their preferred maturity "habitats," Modigliani
and Sutch (1966) offer an almost equally broad interpretation.
Requirements for market completeness provide an intuitive justification for
expecting positive term premia to exist. This paper presents a series of empirical
tests that confirm the existence and variability of positive term premia in the
market for U.S. Treasury securities. These tests comçre market yieldson long-
term securities with cross-section forecasts of future interest rates collected at
four different survey dates.
I. Alternative Term-Structure Hypotheses
With respect to the existence of term premia, the most restrictivetheory is
the pure-expectations theory, PET (Lutz, 1940). According to thePET, investors'
expectations of future short rates completely explain the differential between
short and long rates. Because additional market-completion servicesare not
needed, term premia are identically zero. The alternative hypothesis to PET is
tat unspecified market—completion "rvices are required, so thatnonzero term
premia exist.As portrayed it Figure One's Venn diagram, this alternative
hypothesis —whichwe dub term-premium theory (TPT) —isitself an aggregation
of several narrower hypotheses, each of which assigns the task ofcompleting bond
markets to a disparate set of borrower or lender services. Different versions of
TPT may be developed intuitively from PET by relaxing differentially various of its
restrictive assumptions. The least-restrictive versions of TPTmay be called
unconstrained-premium theories (UPT), since in the absence of extraneous informa-
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tion they place no restrictionson the signs or relative magnitudes of theterm
premia observable in different maturity sectors.UPT interprets term premia
either as risk premia (e.g., Cox,Ingersoll, and Ross, 1978) or as habitat-
displacement allowances (Modigliani andSutch, 1966). Within TPT, alternative
hypotheses to UPT may be divided into the Hicksianliquidity-premium theory
(LPT) and other Constrained-premium theories(OCPT). LPT requires term premia
to be positive and to increase withmaturity in a monotonically nondecreasing
manner. OCPT covers the possibility thatonly one of the two LPT restrictions
holds. From the point of view of statisticaltesting, OCPT is merely a logical
alternative to LPT and UPT, not a fullyinterpreted prior hypothesis.
Term—premium theories also concern themselves withexplaining the behavior
of term premia over time. Thehypothesis of time-invariant term premiaplays a
pivotal role in rnartingale theorists'attempts to denigrate traditional theories of
the term structure. Several studiesexploring restrictions that forecast rationality
and market efficiency place on thejoint processses of expectations formationand
term—structure arbitrage have attempted torepudiate the expectations—based
approach. These authors (e.g., Phillips andPiggenger, 1979) take the position that
short-run movements in long-term interestrates are so nearly random as to be
intrinsically unforecastable. The evidencereported here shows that term prernia
vary over time in systematic ways. Systematicvariation shifts the burden of
Occam's Razor argumentation back ontocritics of the traditionalapproach, since
it suggests that the approximation(Sargent, 1976) involved in themartingale
approach is conceptually deficient (Fama,1976; Pesando, 1979).
II. Derivations and UnderlyingConcepts
Notation
Traditional term-structure theory focuseson single-payment securities, un-
complicated by default risk or special featuresof any kind. The unit price, of4
asecurity that matures in n periods is the discounted preseri tvalueof a dollar at
the maturity date. We find this value by discounting this future dollarn times at
Rat, the yield to maturity for an n-period bond:
1/(1 +Rt),for n1,2,3,. (1)
In this discrete-time conception, the term to maturity ofany bond bounds a set of
n unit maturities. We presume that the "unit maturity" is a minimum period for
economical investment in open-market securities. Our empirical work treats this
interval as the calendar quarter and takesRit as exogenous.
PET Bond-Pricing Framework
Alternative expectations-based theories of the term structure disagreeas to
what basis elements span the space of bond prices. According toPET, logarithms
of current and expected bond prices lie in a linear vectorspace. The equilibrium
price of every long-term security is the product of the prices of any combination of
spot and forward transactions in shorter bonds that spans the same term-to—
rnLturity. The most convenient basis elements for the space of log-prices are the
eurrent and expected intervening future kg-prices of one—period bonds (or "bills").
The familiar PET equilibrium condition expresses precisely this lineardependence.
To derive testable implications from the PET condition, it is convenient to
introduce the auxiliary concept of an investmentstrategy of maturity n. An
investment strategy is an n-tuple, (),thatlists, for each of the n component
periods, the maturity in which the present discounted value of each dollar ofa
planner's matured portfolio is to be held. Two focal strategiesmay be identified:
(1) the "unit" or "rollover" strategy, whose entries are allones, and (2) the "hold—to--
maturity" or 'tfactorial" strategy, whose entries are the successive factors ofn—
factorial. In vector notation:5
The unit strategy: ()= (1,1, 1, ...,1);
The factorial strategy: (n9 (n, n-i, n—2,...,l).
PET makes an expected future dollar just as valuable as a certain one and
requires, for each and every investment period n, that all feasible investment
strategies (including the factorial strategy) have the same equilibrium price as the
unit strategy, Clearly, equals the price of n-period bonds, We
can factor the price of an n-period unit strategy into the product of the price and
quantity of bills an investor must buy at t to roll over into an expected dollar at
t+n. We let Et(...) represent the expectations operator and leave implicit the
conditioning information that investors use at time t in formulating their expecta-
tions of future prices.
It is convenient to proceed recursively. To buy a claim to an expected t+2
dollar via the unity strategy, one must first buy Et(Pit÷i) bills at the price P1.
Putting PitEt(Pi,t+i) in bills at t promises to produce Et(Pi,t+i) dollars at t+i. On
an expected—value basis, the proceeds may be rolled over into just—enough t+i bills
to produce an expected dollar at t+2. Since all 2—period investment strategies must
sell at the same price, Pt(12), which equals PitEt(Pit+i), must also equal the price
of two—period bonds.
Similarly, the price of the three-period unit strategy may be expressed in
terms of the price of two-period bonds and the number of them one must purchase
today to be able to acquire Et(P1,t+2) worth of bills at t+2. Summarizing, we have
established that:
2t = = PitEt(Pi,t+i); (2a)6
3t =t!3P2tEt(Pit÷2) (2b)
Substituting from (2a) into (2b), we obtain (2c):
3
3t = P2tEt(Pit÷2) ltk=2 Et(Pl,t+k_l) • (2c)
For arbitrary n, this equation easilygeneralizes into:
=Pt
=P_i,Et(Pi,t÷_1) =P1k2 Et(Pl,t+k_l), n=2,3,... (2d)
Term Premja
Term premia are defined in the interest-ratemetric. T is the difference
between the yield to maturity on ann-period bond and the expected per-annum
yield on the unit strategy:
T = —1/n —1/n
n=2,3,... (3)
T1 is zero by construction, while equation (2d) assuresus that all term premia
equal zero under PET.
Term-Premium Theory (TPT)
According to TPT, transactions costs andmaturity preferences prevent
factorial and unit strategies frombeing equivalent portfolios, either for borrowers
or for lenders.However, a number of conceptually distinctmicroeconomic
explanations exist as to what accounts for thisnonequivalence: Hicks (1946);
Green (1967); Hirshleifer (1972); Kane(1980); Modigliani and Sutch (1966);McCulloch (1973); Roberts (1980); Roll (1971); Stiglitz (1970); Tuttle, Lee, and
Maness (1978). All versions agree in postulating that for each possible investment
period the anticipated price of an investment strategy must vary not only with the
length of the holding period n, but potentially with the maturity of every
component in the strategy chosen.
Liquidity-Premium Theory (LPT)
Under the liquidity-premium theory (LPT), for any holding period n, the
maximum price is paid for the unit strategy. By investing in a succession of one-
period securities, an investor momentarily liquidates his investments at the
beginning of every component period. When transactions costs are nonzero, this
gives him the option of responding cheaply to new information (e.g., to unfolding
rates of unanticipated inflation). To give up this flexibility in favor of holding in
any component period a k-period security (where k >1),aninvestor must receive a
positive premium in yield, Lk. Moreover, because a bond's liquidity may be
presumed to decrease with its maturity, Lk must increase (or at least not decrease)
with k.
Under LPT, the ex ante yield on any n-period strategy, R(), increases
monotonically with a ceteris paribus increase in any element of the investment-
strategy vector .R()includes a specific liquidity premium to compensate
investors for each and every component-period departure from the unit strategy.
Letting arithmetic averaging of component-period yields approximate the compli-








Propertiesof the average-marginal relationship assure us that LPT restric-
tions on the Lk carry through to the T0. If every Lk is positive, so must everyT
be.Evenin the limiting LPT case where all Lk would have exactly the same value,
the T would still increase with maturity.
Variability ofover Time
Panel A of Table 1 summarizes the implications of alternative term—structure
theories for term premia.Panel B indicates that. disagreement also exists
concerning the sign of the effect that interest rates might have on term premia.
Briefly, Kessel and Cagan portray the Tk as payments made to compensate
for the imperfect moneyness of bonds. Bonds are imperfect substitutes for money
and bills. Since the opportunity cost of increased moneyness is forgone yield, they
hypothesize that lack-of-moneyness allowances should increase with market inter-
est rates. Van Home and Nelson depict the Tk instead as payments made to offset
expected capital losses. Making expected changes in any bond price proportional to
the difference between its current interest rate and its expected long-run average
(r "normal") level, they derive a negative relation between current rates and the
expected capital losses their Tk are supposed to offset. Subsequent research by
Pesando (1975) and Friedman (1979) have affirmed the Kessel-Cagan hypothesis.
With Rt directly entering the calculation (3) of T,additionaltests are desirable
because measurement error in distributed-lag proxies for R(1) could easily bias
the results toward positive association.
It is also important to investigate the logically prior hypothesis that term
premia do not vary over time at all. As the following stylized theorems indicate,
89
the assumption that term premia are time-invariantplays a pivotal role in
martingale representations of the term structure:
1. In the absence of time—varying term premia, market efficiency
requires that long-term interest rates follow a random walk or
martingale sequence if short—term rates do (Sargent, 1976).
2. Even if short-term rates do not follow a random-walk (and the
predictability of Federal Reserve reactions to business and
electoral cycles provides strong reason to believe that U.S.
short rates do not), as long as term premia are time-invariant,
long-term interest rates may still be well approximated by a
martingale (Sargent, 1976).
3. On the other hand, if term premia can be shown tovary over
time in systematic ways, the approximation involved in the
martingale approach must be viewed as conceptually deficient
(Pesando, 1980).
III. The Kane-Ma]kiel Survey Data
To explain the data set, it is necessary to emphasize the difficulty of
confronting term-structure theories with time—series data. The focal issue is not
whether "soft" survey data sets are as good as "hard" time-series evidence. The
issue is how well cx measurementscan approximate cx ante forecasts. Term-
structure theories contemplate an unobservable experiment.Proper experi-
mentation would develop information on expectational variables thatare not
recorded in market transactions.Substituting cx proxy variables whose
relevance depends on the validity of untested auxiliary hypotheses aboutexpecta-
tions formation loosens scientific rules of evidence. Evenworse, because term
premia are estimated as residuals and interest rates are serially correlated,
commonly used distributed-lag proxies for expectations make it doubly hard to test
for the effect of interest rates on term premia.Instead of experimental
observations collected systematically, researchers apply untested assumptions to
accounting data to generate numbers that are interpreted as "observations" on
R(1), the expected holding-period return on the n-period unit strategy.10
The Kane-Malkiel surveys were conceived asaway to test term—structure
theory on its own terms. We collected from the population of institutional lenders
ex ante data on the expectational variables the iieory manipulates. Although the
individuaLs that fill out our questionnaires are not observed in the experimentalact
of buying or selling securities, we Jirected our questionnaires to firmslikely to be
active in securities markets and to individuals within these firms whose job-titles
suggest that they would conceive or execute securities transactions. Although the
artificiality of the reporting context is an inescapable source of measurement
error, at the very least, our data provide an opportunity to covalidate time-series
results.
Data are presented for each of our last four survey dates: January 1969,
July 1969, October 1970, and January 1972. These dates were chosen in part to
sample different phases of the interest-rate cycle to let us investigate hypotheses
about the effect of interest rates on term premia. Two earliersurveys (April 1965
and January 1966) are ignored here because we had not yet honedour survey
instrument to develop R(1) for long holding periods.
We distributed by mail an average of 170 questionnaires at each date.1 An
abbreviated version of the questionnaire is presented as an appendix. Our tests
make use of the data reported in the last column of question 1 and of the first half
of question 3. Holding-period yields are calculated as geometricaverages of the
value of the 91-day bill rate on the survey date and relevant forecasts of this rate
at intervening future dates. Answers to questions 4 and 10 were used todevelop
subsamples by which to assess the representativeness of the aggregate sample.11
Representativeness of Respondent Opinion
Representativeness is a central issue in survey research. Our designated
population is the opinion of market participants, weighted by their market activity.
In recognition of this, our surveys focus on large institutional investors: banks,
nonfinancial corporations (NFCs) insurance companies (ICOs: including both life
and casualty companies), and a smattering of securities dealers.2 Treasury surveys
of ownership indicate that firms in these industries owned over 40 percent of the
public marketable Treasury debt outstanding at each survey date.
According to Bierwag and Grove (1967), we would want ideaily to weight
each response by the size of the respondent's portfolio, by the confidence it has in
its estimates, and by its aggressiveness or willingness to commit funds in support of
its forecasts. Question 4 attempts to sidestep this weighting problem by letting us
identify a group of investors who consider themselves in equilibrium at current
yields. We treat their expectations as a norm against which to measure the
representativeness of aggregate—sample results.
Questions 9 and 10 (which we did not develop until the 1972 survey) let us
investigate the extent to which sample subjects are representative of portfolio
decisionmakers ("bosses") at respondent firms. A few interesting differences
emerge between this "boss" group and the rest of the sample.3
Finally, although our response rate averaged well over 65 percent, non—
response bias must be considered.This bias is best assessed by obtaining
information from nonrespondents. We are fortunate in this respect since (to obtain
information on the summary distributions of respondent forecasts promised as an
incentive to respondents) many nonrespondents wrote us to explain their reasons
for not completing our form. Two principal reasons were cited. First, especially in
the insurance industry, some firms have a strict policy against letting their12
employees "waste" time completing external questionnaires.Second, nonre-
spondent NFCs in particular often excused themselves as lacking in current
knowledgeability due to recent nonparticipationgovernment—securitiesmarkets.
Far from being a problem, this second type of nonresponse is better for our
purposes than an ignorant response.
Measuring Yields on U.S. Treasury Securities
To determine a respondent's perceived term premium, Tk, it is necessary to
subtract his forecasted R(lk), from the market yield, Rk. Our calculations use
data on Rk calculated by Salomon Brothers. Salomon Brothers' yield curves are
widely regarded on Wall Street, but for our purposes they have three weaknesses.
First, since they are reported on a semiannual true-yield basis, they are not
immediately comparable to the 3—month Treasury-bill rate forecasts impounded in
our estimates of R(lk). Treasury bills are typically quoted on a bank-discount
basis. Because an unknown number of respondents may have either reported true-
yield figures or based their bank—discount calculations on a 360-day rather than
365-day year, it is not possible to align market yields exactly. For four different
caturities at each survey date, Table 2 presents three alternative sets of market
yields.Since bank-discount rates are lower than true yields, using them to
calculate term premia is a conservative procedure, biased against finding large
premia. We focused on 365-day yields on the grounds that at least some
respondents were reporting bill rates on a true-yield basis and that 365-day yield
quotations have become more common than 360-day figures. We present the 360-
day yields for anyone who wants to test the sensitivity of our results to this
assumption. 360-day Tk run about four basis points (a basis point is 1/100 of a
percentage point) less than our 365-dayestimates.4
Two other sources of measurement error are discussed in Section V. The
effects of variation in the dates on which individual questionnaires were filled out13
and of distortions in market yields caused by differentialtaxability are handled in a
post—mortem sensitivity analysis of our principal findings.
IV. Cross-Section Tk and Tests of Alternative Theories
Our cross-section focus lets us address meaningful hypotheses withelemen-
tary statistical tests.In this study, inference is based upon: (1) t-tests of
significant difference of respondents' mean Tk from zero; (2) Mann-Whitneytests
of differences between the means of two samples (t—testsbeing rendered less
reliable by frequent significant differences in sample variances); (3) binomialtests
focused on the percentage of observed premia that arepositive; and (4) rank—
correlation and concordance tests of the influence of interest rateson the level of
term premia.
Evidence for Rejecting PET for TPT
Table 3 summarizes the data used in our first and mostimportant test. For
both the aggregate sample and the maturity—indifferentsubsample, the table
presents mean values, measured in basis points, for four premia at eachsurvey
date. For 1972, mean Tk are also calculatedseparately for the "Boss" subsample of
each group. Four maturities are covered: half-year, oneyear, two years, and ten
years. Only one of the 32 sample means is not significantly greater thanzero. In
the single case (January, 1969T112) where the mean premium is not significantly
greater than zero, even using 360-day yields, one must also reject thehypothesis
that the premium is significantly less than zero. Anear-zero premium is least
damaging to TPT when it attaches to the shortest maturity distinguishable in the
data.5
In 1972, we can focus specifically on a subsample ofrespondents who make
portfolio decisions for their firms. For this boss group, PET is rejectedeven more
emphatically. Bosses' mean term premia prove generally higher than those for14
other respondents.6 These differences arestatistically significant in the aggregate
sample, but not in the smaller maturity-indifferent ..ubsample.
Table 4 investigates whether theaverege premia reported in Table 3 owe
their significance to a few large outliers. Weinvestigate this possibility by asking
whether the proportion of respondentsreporting a positive term premium signifi-
cantly exceeds fifty percent. In these tests, the January 1969T112 continues to be
troublesome, but only one other observation (aggregate-sampleT2 in 1972) fails to
produce a ratio significantly larger than fifty percent.
Evidence Affirming LPT and OCPT over PHT
Tables 3 and 4 establish that term premiaare generally positive, refuting
the pure-expectatiors theory. In Table 5,we inquire whether term premia increase
significantly with maturity as LPT predicts. Using Occam'sRazor, we should be
prepared to neglect institutional information such as thedistribution of borrowers'
and lenders' maturity habitats featured in thepreferred—habitat theory if both LPT
restrictions are upheld.
By LPT, a longer-maturity term premium always exceedsa shorter one. At
euh date, our data set generates six pairs ofpremia. In most cases, the longer
premium does significantly exceed the shorter one. In theaggregate sample, only
five of the 24 pairs fail to show a significantdifference and a sixth case(T2 versus
T10 in July 1969) shows countersignificance. (Post-mortemanalysis undertaken in
Section V suggests that this anomaly traces totax bias.) In the focal maturity-
indifferent group, only eight of thetwenty-four pairs fail to show a significant
difference and no countersignificant evidence isobserved. Within the parallel boss
groups in 1972, the evidence in favor of LPT is much thesame.
Behavior of Term Premia over Time
Except for one anomalous observation, Table 5upholds the monotonically
nondecreasing restriction of LPT, though thegap between two and ten years15
maturity leaves open the issue of an intermediate peak. Table R tests the
straightforward null hypothesis that at each maturity the term premium is the
same at each survey date. The alternative hypothesis does not specify any
particular pattern of expected differences across dates. Because two-thirds to
three-fourths of the paired premia differ significantly across survey dates, we
reject the null hypothesis (critical to the interpretation of martingale research)
that the premium structure is time-invariant.
This finding sets up our next task: to see if we can explain the changes in
Tk that we observe. Neglecting other potential determinants, we investigatethe
relation between term premia and market interest rates. Both for the aggregate
sample and the maturity-indifferent subsample, rank correlations between the Tk
and the k-year yields recorded in Table 2 are strongly positive. Because each such
correlation shows only three degrees of freedom, it is convenient to focus our
significance tests on coefficients of concordance, W (see Siegel, 1956). Concor-
dance calculations let us pool ranks across maturities and survey dates. For both
sample groupings, W is 0.83 (after correcting for a tie in the case of maturity—
indifferent respondents). This value is significant even at the one-percent level.
V. Post-Mortem Analysis
Comparing Cross-Section and Time-Series Premium Estimates
Table 7 collects parallel time-series measurements of term premia. The
upper panel compares McCulloch's (1975a) mean estimates of T112, T1, T2, and T10
during 1951-1966 with the mean values achieved in our surveys. Our cross-section
premia are much higher, but rise proportionately as steeply as McCulloch's values.
Because the generally higher values of the cross-section estimates are drawn from
the higher interest—rate era of 1969-1972, they may be said to reinforce the rank—
correlation evidence in favor of the hypothesis that interest rates impact positively
on term premia.16
Table 7's second panel develops time—series estirnate foronlytwo premia,
T112 and T1, for dates one month in advance of our first three survey dates. These
are rough figures calculated from worksheets that esando (1975) graciously made
available. The dates are closely enough aligned to support comparison. Pesando's
and our results show similar values forT112 at each date and the lowest values for
both premia occur at the first date. The major differences concern much-lower
time-series estimates of T1, especially on the first two survey dates whenthey are
below T112 and on one occasion even negative. Lacking standard errors for these
premia, we cannot formally test the significance of these discrepancies, but it is
clear that these data could not reject PHT or OCPT as alternative hypotheses to
LPT.
Allowing for Measurement Error in Yields
Precisely because our approach to measuring term premia is so straight—
forward, it is important to identify potential sources of measurement error and to
discuss whether and how these might affect the qualitative pattern of results
observed.
We have dealt throughout with the danger that respondent forecasts might
not be representative of market opinion. But two other sources of bias remain:
1.Since questionnaires wee completed at different dates, variousrespon-
dents' forecasts made use of different information sets.
2. The capital-gains tax preference and 4.25—percent interest ceilingon
coupon bonds combined to bias long—term Treasury yields downward.7
1. Response-Timing Bias. In principle, we want to measure each respondent's
anticipations of yield on alternative unit strategies on the survey date itself. In
practice, it is unreasonable to expect busy executives to complete questionnaires
the moment they receive them. Our mail brought a batch of questionnaires each17
day for about two and a half weeks after our mailings, with dribs and drabsarriving
even later.
If we adopt the convenient hypothesis that compounded forecast revisions
would be positively related to movements in market rates between thesurvey date
and the date shown in respondent postmarks,8 Table 8 allowsus to make some
rough corrections for differences in the timing of responses. In January 1969,
yields showed little net movement during the months after the survey date. Since
the ten—year yield moved up relatively steadily, R(110) may have been overstated
slightly. Correcting for this would tend to raise T10 above its Table 3 value.
After July, 1969 the ten-year yield was unchanged, but the otheryields rose
between 17 and 32 basis points. These movements would tend to raisenear-term
yield forecasts, resulting in underestimates ofT112, T1, and T2. Correcting for
this would tend to flatten the slope of the term-premium curve and toaccentuate
the LPT-refuting decline from T2 andT10.
After October 1, 1970, short yields fell more sharply thanten-year ones.
This would tend to lower near-term forecasts more than distantones, making our
calculations underestimate October 1 forecasts. Correcting for this would lower
term-premium estimates generally but especially in the short end. This would
steepen the term-premium structure and might driveT112 close to zero.
After January 1, 1972, half-year and one-year rates fell, whilelonger rates
rose. This suggests that R(1112) and R(11) may have been understated andR(12)
and R(110) overstated. Correcting for this would lowerT112 and T1 (possibly to
near-zero levels) while raising T2 and T10. This correction would steepen the
term-premium structure and might very well remove the LPT-refuting decline
between T1 and T2.
In summary, correcting for the timing of responses wouldsteepen the
structure of term premia on three of the four survey dates. It would also lower the18
mean value ot T112 across surveys, perhaps substantially. Thm the point of view
of LPT, the only di.sconfirming effect is to heighten the July 1969 decline observed
between T2 and T10. However, the next section in'icates that much (if not all) of
this decline reflects tax bias.
2. Tax Bias. Although the Tax Reform Act of 1969 denies thisprivilege to
financial institutions, price appreciation on U.S. Treasury bonds isgenerally
treated as a capital gain. Because capital gains are taxed more lightly thancoupon
yields, at equal yields a discount security would promise a higher after-tax return.9
If we suppose that the law of one price applies to after-taxholding-period yields,
equilibrium yields to maturity on discount securities ar' systematically understated
(Pye). Because long-term Treasurys sold at substantial discounts atevery survey
date (thanks to the 4.25 percent ceiling then allowed on bond coupons), this
understatement of yields biases downward our estimates ofT10.
For ten-year yields, Table 9 provides rough estimates of the size of this bias
at each survey date. The bias should be negligible for the shortermaturities, since
high—coupons securities—and below one-year even Treasury bills—were available.
Using the assumptions stated in the note to the table, tax bias is calculated by
equalizing after-tax running yields on a 4.25-percent coupon issue and a hypotheti-
'al new issue selling at par. Adding only half of this bias to theT10 estimates
reported in Table 3 is enough to wipe out the bothersome decline betweenT2 and
T10 observed in July 1969.
VI. Summary and Implications
Our cross-section estimates strongly confirm TPT over PET and are unable
to reject the restrictions on term premia implied by LPT. In general, whatever
one's holding period, one can expect to earn more by investing ina long-term
instrument than in a shorter one. This higher expected yieldmay be interpreted as19
compensation for the risk and inconvenience to lenders of accepting a long-term
coin iriitrnent.
Statistical tests reject the inartingale—theory hypothesis that term premia
are time-invariant and indicate that observed variation is positively associated
with the level of interest rates.20
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1The number distributed variedprimarily because of respondent requests for
deletion and because of a follow-up focus adopted in the July 1969 andJanuary
1972 surveys (to test theories of expectations revision) that reduced the size of
these mailings.
2Our sampling frame reliedheavily on Fortune's "largest" lists. Kane and Malkiel
(1967) explains our procedures in more detail arid reports term premia observed in
our first (April, 1965) survey.
3We also tested thehomogeneity of estimated term premia across different classes
of institutions at each survey date. About five percent of institutionpairs showed
differences that proved significant at five percent. No differenceswere signifi- cant at one percent.
4We might point out thatconverting the market yields to a bank-discount basis
requires only sixteen calculations. Converting respondent estimates ofR(i) to a
true-yield basis would require almost two—thousand calculations.
5Appendix Table 1 illustrates how termpremia are calculated and shows that term
premia average even higher and exhibit much the same qualitative pattern when
the mean bill-rate forecasts are converted to bond yields and subtracted from
continuously compounded yields on hypothetical single-payment bonds.
6Means for nonbosses differ in theopposite direction from the aggregate—sample
means. The latter figures are best interpreted as a weighted average of the means
for the boss and nonboss subsamples.
7Additioal downward bias dueto the preponderance of "flower bonds" (those
acceptable at par in payment of federal estate taxes) among long-term Treasury
securities is presumably corrected away in Salomon Brothers' calculations.
8This is theerror-learning hypothesis. For evidence, see Meiselman (1962), Malkiel
and Kane (1969), Diller (1969), and Kane (1970).






B. Relation Between Tk andRk Over Time
Theorists 31k Hypothesized sign of
k
Kessel; Cagan Positive
Van Home; Nelson Negative
Martingale TheoristsZero: Term premia should not vary over time.
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— ()iou allk 2, 3,...,
T1> 0 for all k2,3,..., (Positive)
1k-1 for all k —2,3,..., (Nondcereasing)
Only one of the LPT restrictions holds.








Converted to Three-Month Discount Rates (365-Day Basis)
6.21 6.17 6.15 5.82
7.01 7.09 7.03 6.30
6.25 6.44 6.62 6.93
3.97 4.28 4.64 5.83
Salomon Yields Converted to Three-Month Discount Rates (360-Day Basis)**
January1, 1969 6.17 6.13 6.11
July 1, 1969 6.97 7.05 6.99
October 1, 1970 6.21 6.40 6.59
January 1, 1972 3.94 4.24 4.60
*SalomonBrothers, (1974),pp. 17—18.
**Takenfrom bond tables in Treasury Bills (1966) and
Supplement (1969), Boston: Financial Publishing Company.
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Table 2
Market Yields at Survey Dates






6.36 6.32 6.29 5.95
7.20 7.28 7.22 6.45
6.40 6.60 6.79 7.11





Estimated Term Premia, Tk, for Four Different




Jan.,1969 July, 1969 Oct., 1970 Jan., 1972 Jan 1972
Subsample











A. Aggregate Sample of Survey Respondents
7 (131)52 (100)44 (119)21 (91)24 (62)
29 (128)73 (100)69 (116)23 (89)28 (61)
46 (117)94 (96)84 (113)15 (82)22(59)
45+(119)59 (98) 101 (118)66 (85)67 (58)
B. Subset of Survey Respondents That Did Not Perceive A
Particular Maturity Range as Attractive for Investment
2# (37)53 (32)42 (56)21 (50)24(35)
23 (37)70 (32)66 (54) 26 (49) :31(35)
44 (35)84 (31)81 (52)20 (44)26 (33)
62± (32)56 (32)95 (56)70 (48)66 (33)
Notes:
*Foreach survey date, T is calculated as the difference between (1) the yield on U.S. Treasury
securities of maturity k eported in Salomon Brothers (1974) adjusted to a 365-day discount basis and
(2) the mean of the annual rates of return forecasted for the k—period unit investment strategy
+ Differencefrom parallel rate in other panel is significantly different at 5 percent, using the
Mann-Whitney test statistic.


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































OUTCCME OF MANN-WHITNEY TESTS FOCUSED ON DIFFERENCES IN TERMPREMIA
ACROSS MATURITIES AT EACH SURVEY DATE
Specific Pair of Term Premia Being Compared
____________________________________(TT2) (T112,T10) (T1T2)
A. Aggregate Sample of Survey Respondents
CODE: +:Term premium is significantly larger (at 5 %)forthe longer-maturity premium.
o:Difference in term premia is not significant (at 5 %).
-: Termpremium is significantly smaller (at 5 %)forthe longer-maturity premium.
Survey Date (T112,T1) —- (T1T10) (T2T10)
January 1, 1969 + +
July 1, 1969 + + 0 + 0
October 1, 1970 + + + ,- .- ..
January 1, 1972 0 + + 0 ÷ ÷
January 1, 1972
ttBossI subsample 0 0 + 0 + +
B.. Subset of Respondents Who Did
as Attractive for Investment
NotPerceive a ParticularMaturity Range
January 1, 1969 + + + + + +
July 1, 1969 + + 0 0 0 0
Octob 1,1970 + + + + 0
January 1, 1972 0 + 0 + +
January 1, 1972
"Boss"subsample 0 0 + 0 + +27
TABLE6
OUTCOME OF MANN-WHITNEY TESTS FOCUSED ON WHETHER VALUES
OF THE TERM PREMIA VARY ACROSS SAMPLE DATES
Maturity, k Pair of Survey Dates Being Compared
(1—69,7—69) (1—69,10—70) (1—69,1—72) (7—69,10—70) (7—69,1—72) (10—70,1—72)
A. Aggregate Sample of Survey Respondents
1/2Year + + + + + +
lyear + + 0 0 + +
2years + + + 0 ÷ +
loyears 0 + + + 0 +
B.Subset of Respondents Who Did Not Perceive A Particular Maturity Range
as Attractive for Investment
1/2year + + + + + +
lyear + + 0 0 + +
2years + + + 0 + +
loyears 0 0 0 0 0 +
CODE:+:Observed difference in Tk is statistically significant (at 5 %)acrossthe
pair of survey dates.
0 : Observed difference is not statistically significant (at 5 %).Table 7
PARALLEL TIME-SERIES M F'iSUREMENTS
OF TERM PREMIA
(in basis points)













1/2 year 9 3 15 31
lyear 15 7 22 49
2 years 19 11 27 60
10 years 22 12 31 68
Summary Description
ofQualitative Increasing Increasing Pattern Increasing
B. Values of Term Premia Near Three Survey Dates, Estimated




Maturity December 1, 1968 June 1, 1969 September k 1, 1970 Mean
1/2 year 14 47 51 37
1 year —10 36 58 2829
TABLE8
Changes in U.S. Treasury Yields During the Two Months
Following Each Survey Date
(in basis points)
Maturity
Post—Survey Months 1/2 year 1 year 2 years 10 years
January 1969 —4 —2 -6 +5
February 1969 +5 +7 +12 +15
July 1969 +32 +24 +17 0
August 1969 —15 +8 +1 +12
October 1970 —16 -25 —19 +8
November 1970 —103 —115 —124 —78
January 1970 —28 —15 +13 +23
February 1972 +5 +9 -6 -2
Source: Salomon Brothers (1974), pp. 16-18.30
TABLE.
PostmortemCalculation of Capital-Gains Bias
(in percent per annum)
Survey Date 10-Year Yield Reported by Coupon Rate that Estimated
Salomon Brothers (assumes Would Offer the Bias
a 4.25% coupon) Same After-tax Yield
to a Corporate Investor*
January 1, 1969 5.95 6.80 .85
July 1, 1969 6.45 7.55 .90
October 1, 1970 7.11 8.25 1.14
January 1, 1972 5.96 6.64 .68
*Thjg calculation employs a 50 percent tax rateon coupon income and a capital-gains rate of 25 percent in 1969 and 30 percent in 1970 and1972. No allowance is made for the deferral of capital-gains taxes.
Cook and Hendershott's (1978) monthly werage "new-issueequivalent U.S. bond yields" for the
survey months show the following values (in percent): 6.85, 6.88, 7.81, 6.71.APlkNDl X
()tESi'l(,NN1\lKL.oNINI IRLSl-RAl1: lORL(ASIS
AI)hlevii (l Vceioii)
(I)For each of lte 14J1l )VIII!Ituitiedales,svhit ateyourbest esI itilates of
(a) the range beweeii s.Iiieli yields on )t) div 'Ircasuty bill5 will lie and



















I expect the average rate on 90-day Treasury bills
over the next 10 years to be
I expect the average rate on 10-year U. S. government
bonds over the next 10 years to be
Range Most Likely Value
Between _______%and___________%__________%
Range Most Likely Value
Between _______%and___________ % _________%
(4) Do you feel that, at the present time, there is a maturity range of Treasury securities which is particularly attractive?
(a) Yes, the maturity range from years months to years months is especially attractive
for investment.
(b) No, prices in all maturity ranges are pretty much in line.
(c) Other, please elaborate:
(9)Does your firm have an investment Committee that meets to make portfolio decisions? ________________
(10)Are you a member of this Comnmuitlee, or otherwise responsible for portfolio decisiomis? __________________
April 1, l)72: Between % ammd
July 1, 1972: Between___,.artd_______
Oct. I, 1972: Between % amid
,______
Jan. 1973: Between_ and__________
April 1, 1973: Between ........%and,_ %
July 1, 1973: Between %and_________
Oct. 1, 1973: Between %
Jan.1, 1974: Between %and
(3) For both the 90-day l'reasurv bill rate and the 10-year Ii. S. government bond rate mentioned in question 2, please indicate
your estimate of the average rate over the next 10 years.32
r\;i.iudjx Tible
lhLtt Ur tui Wtiv dJeultions of I'erru Ireinia
1. i1d iluu L :\fltt;liii I1csfor Aggregate Sample of Survey Respondents
10—year
JunuaLy 1, 1969 .14 5.88 5.69 5.37
July1, 1969 6.49 6.36 6.10 5.71
October 1, 1970 5.81 5.74 5.78 5.92
January I, [972 3.76 4.05 4.49 5.17
2. (onve!ion of QuarterlyMean LxAnte Bill Rates from Three—Month Bank—Discount
Rates to Continuously Compounded Yields*
January 1, 1969 6.27 6.01 5.81 5.48
July 1, 1969 6.63 6.50 6.23 5.83
October1, 1970 5.93 5.86 5.90 6.05
January 1,1972 3.83 4.13 4.58 5.28
3.Continuously Compounded Market Yields on HypotheticalSingle-Payment Bonds (Calculated in Percent Per Annum by J.H.McCulloch**)
January 1, 1969 6.56 6.62 6.59 6.42
July1, 1969 7.20 7.67 7.49 6.59
October 1, 1970 6.54 6.60 6.68 7.30
January 1, 1972 4.03 4.29 4.83 5.97
4. Estimates of Aggregate-Sample Term
Premia, Derived by Subtracting Figures in
Panel 2 from Corresponding Entries in Panel 3 (inBasis Points)
Jan.1,1969 July 1,1969 Oct.1,1970 Jan.1,1972
6 months 29 57 61 20
1 year 61 117 74 16
2 years 78 126 78 25
10 years 94 76 125 69
*T!leseyields are convertedfrom three-month bank—discount rates, d, tocontinuously compoundedyields by the formula
—36500 90 R =
90ln(1—3-.0 d).
**Cajcljlatedfrompreceding-dayclosing quotations via MeCulloch's computer program
(based on I 975), which is availablethrough the NBE1I.33
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